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Trademark law has come into its own. Traditionally, trademarks were
lumped together with patents as “industrial property,” with the law
following suit. 1 With the rise in consumerism, marketing and globalization,
trademarks and the law surrounding their protection has become important,
separate and apart from other forms of intellectual property. After all, when
more than half of Apple, Inc.’s valuation (deemed to be the world’s most
valuable global brand in 2011 2 ) derives from its trademarks, 3 legal issues
surrounding the protection of such wealth are bound to arise. In recent
years, scholars have begun to focus their attention on this previously understudied area. A testament to the richness of this recent scholarly upsurge in
trademark law is Graeme Dinwoodie’s and Mark Janis’ compendium
entitled, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH.
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY brings together a global collection of
nineteen highly-respected scholars and is an excellent resource for
practitioners, students, and trademark scholars, alike. Dinwoodie and
Janis have handily split the compilation of articles into three topical
sections, which helps guide the reader through the variety of theories and
arguments presented. The organization also provides possible topical
pathways to lead an advanced trademark law class or seminar, and thus is
helpful to the educator as well. As a note of caution, however, it should be
made clear that TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY is not intended for
the uninitiated. Rather, the reader needs at least a baseline understanding of
the standard accounts of trademark law in order to appreciate the
scholarship represented in this collection. This is especially true in the first
topic, entitled “Methodological Perspectives,” which provides an array of
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theoretical frameworks through which trademark protection can be viewed.
Ranging from historical to semiotics to economic perspectives, each of the
five articles in this section gives a slightly different account of trademarks
and the law surrounding their protection.
It has become a truism that the scope of trademark protection has been on
an expansionist path since the early twentieth century. 4 From an expansion
in the subject matter that may comprise a trademark to an expansion in the
scope of likelihood of confusion (the standard by which trademark
infringement is tested), trademark law has progressively expanded in one
direction: toward providing a greater scope of rights to trademark holders. 5
While one of the more standard explanations for such expansion has been
that trademarks are being treated as “property,” 6 Lionel Bentley questions
this explanation from a historical perspective (pp.3-41). Bentley provides a
well-documented historical account that traces the term “property” as
applied to trademark rights to the mid-to-late nineteenth century (pp.15-30).
Bentley’s analysis shows that historical material can help with tracing
different reasons for the current trend of expansionism and in explaining
why the term property did not have a transformative effect on trademark
rights in the nineteenth century. Bentley concludes that it has likely been a
transformation of the substantive meaning of the term “property” since the
nineteenth century, rather than an adoption of a property rhetoric, that has
resulted in an expansion of trademark rights (p.41).
From Bentley’s historical perspective, the reader is treated to a semiotic
account of trademark law and culture, through Barton Beebe’s thoughtprovoking essay (pp.42-64), which provides the reader with an alternative
theoretical justification for supporting and understanding certain trademark
doctrines. Semiotics, as “the study of signs and sign systems” (p.42), brings
a structural approach to viewing trademarks, which is a different account
than the standard economic one (p.43). Beebe argues that the application of
semiotics to trademark doctrine is a worthwhile enterprise because the
standard efficiency arguments of economics do not fully account for certain
trademark doctrines such as trademark distinctiveness and trademark
dilution (p.43). In fact, the semiotic, triadic structure of trademarks (the
triadic structure consisting of a signifier (the trademark itself, like APPLE),
a signified (the meaning or goodwill attached to APPLE, such as quality
consumer electronics) and a referent (the tangible product that APPLE
signifies, such as personal computers or cell phones) (p.45)), appears to be
an implicit assumption in the standard economic account (p.48). But due to
the economic rationale’s failure to recognize the implicit adoption of the
triadic structure, certain troublesome doctrines, like trademark dilution, are
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presented as simply another form of trademark infringement. However,
when analyzed through the semiotic lens, it becomes apparent that dilution
is far more problematic than already acknowledged, as it entails the
granting of “absolute property rights, against the world, in that mark”
(p.59). Beebe himself leaves implicit that this expansion of rights through
protection against dilution may not be what anyone wants, even those in
favor of the economic account. Perhaps more disturbing is that it would
appear a semiotic explanation of the cultural implication of trademarks in
modern society hints that further expansion of trademark law is likely in
store in order to meet the consumer demand for “signs, distinctions,
differences” (p.64).
However, a re-examination of the search costs rationale (the economic
justification for trademark protection) may provide some check on this
trend, as Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley suggest in their essay (pp.65-94).
Dogan and Lemley argue that if taken to the extreme, the search costs
rationale may lead to a reversal of the goal of the economic justification for
trademark law and lead to an anti-competitive marketplace (p.66).
Therefore, Dogan and Lemley proffer a different application of the search
costs rationale: one that would serve to limit trademark protection to where
search costs are lowered, but without going too far in the other direction.
The reasoning proffered by Dogan and Lemley is that each of the doctrines
discussed in the essay present search costs rationales on both sides of
protection: finding in favor of the trademark holder may reduce
competition, whereas finding in favor of limiting trademark protection may
increase confusion and thereby search costs (p.84). Dogan and Lemley
argue that courts will generally find in favor of limitations in a way that
attempts to benefit the most number of consumers, where overall search
costs would be lowered or where competition concerns are paramount.
Additionally, Dogan and Lemley offer useful modifications in the
application of these doctrines to provide courts with the ability to
appropriately apply limitations.
While the first three essays in the “Methodological Perspectives” section
looks at justifications of trademark law and its expansion as a whole, the
last essay in the section by Clarissa Long (pp.132-147), provides an
examination of the forces that have created and shaped a particular portion
of trademark law, trademark dilution. Dilution is one of the more recent
expansions in trademark law, beginning in the twentieth century. 7
Although Congress codified federal dilution protection in 1995, many
courts applying the doctrine were unwilling to broadly interpret the statute,
culminating in the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the scope of the law in
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2005. 8 Not long after this Supreme Court decision Congress revised the
statute to reinstate its expansive scope in 2006. 9 Long examines this tugand-pull of interpretation and legislation, providing a number of insightful
explanations for why Congress adopted dilution in the first place and why
courts were eager to narrow its scope (pp.142-43). Unfortunately for the
reader, at the time of Long’s writing, courts had not had enough time to
fully interpret the new provisions of the federal dilution law (p.146).
However, Long is optimistic and argues that courts should continue to act in
conformity with their past actions as a counterweight to the Congressional
expansion of dilution law (p.147).
For a slight change in pace, the fourth essay in the series, Robert Burrell’s
Trade Mark Bureaucracies (pp.95-131), looks at justifications for the
registration of trademarks, which as he rightly notes, is an under-examined
area (p.95). The first main justification Burrell examines in-depth is the
“clearance cost” justification. This justification is premised on the
argument that a trademark registry provides a certain level of comfort to the
trademark applicant and to the consuming public: with a simple search, all
who are interested know which marks are taken by others. Burrell quickly
debunks this justification by showing the problems of false negatives, false
positives and the quality of the information provided by registries (pp.98109). In addition, Burrell examines two additional justifications, first, that
registration can provide protection to a trademark holder prior to actual use
of such mark and second, that registration creates the property rights in the
trademark. Concluding that neither of these provides sufficient justification
for registration, Burrell concedes that abolishing the registration system
would be extremely difficult. Instead, Burrell suggests a number of lines of
thought that could be used to reform the registration system, including
calling attention to the current emphasis on “customer service” that may be
undermining the policing of applications.
The second section in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY turns the
reader to “International and Comparative Dimensions” of trademark law.
Unfortunately for the reader, this section would be more appropriately
named “International and European Perspectives,” as the essays (with the
exception of Burton Ong’s bilateral free trade agreement-focused essay) are
all focused on European issues of trademark law. The section could have
been more well-rounded if one or two of the essays were focused on other
areas of the world, such as Latin America, the Middle East or Asia. This is
not to say that these essays are not invaluable, to the contrary, these essays
provide an American reader with an insight into two of the top issues in
current European trademark law: harmonization of the laws and parallel
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importation. These insights are desperately needed, as a good deal of
discussion of American trademark law takes place without an inclusion of
such comparative dimensions.
For example, Annette Kur’s essay, Fundamental Concerns in the
Harmonization of (European) Trademark Law (pp.151-176) and Gail
Evans’ essay, Substantive Trademark Law Harmonization: On the
Emerging Coherence Between the Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate
Body and the European Court of Justice (pp.177-203), provide the
American reader with a perspective of trademark law that really does not
get raised in the United States. Since American trademark law is federallybased (for the most part), 10 it is rare that discussions of harmonization of
trademark legal doctrines across the fifty states arise. In addition, with the
ambiguous nature of World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body
rulings vis à vis American domestic law, 11 the harmonization of the United
States Supreme Court decisions (or any other U.S. federal court) with the
WTO rulings is not typically at the top of the list of trademark law concerns
in the U.S. Therefore, the essays by Kur and Evans are a welcome addition
to the average American trademark law scholar’s (or student’s) knowledge
base. And while Thomas Hays’ essay, The Free Movement (or Not) of
Trademark Protected Goods in Europe (pp.204-228), is focused on
European concerns of parallel imported products, with concerns regarding
parallel importation into the United States on the rise, 12 this essay raises
important and interesting issues for any trademark scholar.
The last essay in this section will be of interest to the internationallyminded American trademark law scholar or student. Burton Ong provides a
concise overview of the trademark law provisions of the various bilateral
free trade agreements that the United States has entered into over the years
(pp.229-255). Ong shows that there are at least three categories of
provisions that the United States includes in all of its bilateral free trade
agreements. Ong posits that these similar provisions (in the “TRIPS-plus”
category) across the “web” of bilateral free trade agreements provides “a
clear factual basis for those who have criticized the use of bilateral [free
trade agreements] as a ‘forum-shifting’ device of sorts to set higher
intellectual property standards outside of multilateral regimes such as the
TRIPS Agreement” (pp.248-250). Although Ong finds this movement
towards TRIPS-plus trademark law protection worrying (pp.254-255), he
concludes on a hopeful note (echoing that of Long’s conclusion), which is
that in the implementation and interpretation of these various provisions,
courts will be skeptical in applying these provisions in a broad sense
(p.255).
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The third, and last section of TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY is
entitled “Critical Issues,” and presents four subsections of a variety of
issues; the first two issues (free speech and limiting trademark rights) have
plagued scholars of trademark law during its expansion over the past
century and the last two issues (traditional knowledge and the edges of
trademark protection) are of more recent vintage. The first subsection,
“Trademarks and Speech,” begins with a revisiting by Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss of her groundbreaking work in trademark law and free speech
interests from the 1990s (pp.261-293). Dreyfuss’ earlier work 13 had
recognized that the expansions in trademark law were placing pressure on
the interests of free speech, with courts providing an increasing amount of
protection to trademark holders of marks that were merely used in an
expressive format (p.262). In this essay, Dreyfuss examines the doctrinal
approaches that have been taken globally to resolve this tug-of-war between
protection and expression (pp.267-283), and argues that in the end, the
better normative approach is for lawmakers to take into account the recent
scientific evidence that shows how consumers actually deal with confusion
(pp.287-293). Dreyfuss concludes that some confusion and even dilution is
inevitable: “In an economy in which consumers have immediate access to
products and services everyone on the globe, in a legal environment in
which symbols are protected in multiple ways, in a culture in which
trademarks constitute a significant medium of expression, freedom from all
sources of confusion or dilution is simply not achievable” (p.293).
Moving from general expressive uses of trademarks, Rebecca Tushnet’s
essay (pp.294-323) examines an important connection between the First
Amendment and trademark law (including false advertising law). Tushnet
points out that if the First Amendment’s increasing concern for commercial
speech were applied wholesale to trademark law, many standard
assumptions and doctrines would be overturned (p.303). The crux of the
problem is that First Amendment jurisprudence treats true and false
commercial speech as polar opposites; trademarks and advertising,
however, can be confusing to some and helpful to others. But the current
First Amendment jurisprudence cannot take into account this type of
“shades of gray” analysis. Tushnet suggests that each area of the law could
learn from the other, concluding that “[t]here are insights to be had from a
hard look at the First Amendment from an unfair competition perspective,
as well as from a hard look at unfair competition law from a First
Amendment perspective” (p.323).
The last essay in this subsection (pp.324-341), provides a fresh look at the
overlap between trademarks and expressive uses from the perspective of
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both the trademark owner and third party user. In particular, Michael
Spence is concerned that the current justifications for “allusive uses” do not
provide sufficient support for restrictions against such use (p.326). In other
words, Spence seeks to provide an alternative justification for the doctrine
of trademark dilution, as it is more commonly referred to in the United
States. The justification proffered by Spence is one of “expressive
autonomy,” which takes into account the right of the trademark owner to
restrict allusions to its registered trademark, as well as the right of a third
party user of the same trademark (p.331). On one side, the trademark
owner should be free from a compulsion to express something that it has not
chosen, as well as be free from subsidizing a message it does not want to be
associated with (pp.331-335). On the other side, trademark users should be
allowed the right to allusive uses, despite these rights of the trademark
owner (p.337). Therefore, Spence identifies two situations where third
parties should be permitted to make allusive uses of registered trademarks:
first, where the use is necessary for the third party to “adequately” refer,
comment or identify his own products (p.337), and second, where the
trademark at issue has become an “important indexical function” that “the
mark may have become a kind of public forum” (pp.338-339). Spence
concludes his essay by arguing that it is this ability to allow both the
trademark owner and the third party user limited rights to restricting
allusive uses, on the one hand, and allowing the same on the other, that
makes an expressive autonomy justification “particularly attractive”
(p.341).
The next subsection, “Limiting the Scope of Trademark Rights,” can be
viewed as an extension of the first subsection in that the authors are
discussing ways in which trademark rights can be cabined. Instead of
focusing on the free speech concerns of expansive trademark rights,
however, the three authors in this subsection each offer a different
perspective. Beginning with Jennifer Davis’ essay (pp.345-367), the reader
is exposed to an examination of two similar traditions of cabining expansive
trademark rights, one in the United Kingdom and one in the United States,
with one tradition more vulnerable to modern limitations than the other.
Davis traces a tradition of a “trademark commons” in the United Kingdom
from the late nineteenth century all the way to the late twentieth century,
where British judges protected the right of competitors to use registered
trademarks that were of descriptive or “laudatory” origins (pp.347-353). In
contrast, the tradition in the United States has been one of a “public
domain,” borrowed from copyright law (p.361). Davis posits that it is in the
different approaches to the trademark commons and the public domain that
made the trademark commons vulnerable to “enclosure” (p.365). Although
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Davis does not explicitly state this, it would seem that an enclosure of the
trademark commons has resulted in a limitation of the common law’s ability
in the United Kingdom to cabin the expansive scope of trademark rights.
Graeme Austin’s essay (pp.368-403) brings the reader back to the United
States, where trademark infringement lawsuits are typically viewed with the
belief that an application of the likelihood of confusion analysis
encapsulates the appropriate, fact-based consumer response to a defendant’s
use of plaintiff’s trademark (p.370). Austin proffers that trademark
infringement is not this easily resolved, and nor should it be (p.370).
Instead, Austin suggests that courts should be looking “a little harder at the
role played by the ‘ordinarily prudent consumer’ in trademark law” (p.371).
In so doing, Austin offers that courts would take into account differing
policies that underlie trademark law, which would be beneficial as it would
serve to cement the role that such policies play in the development of
trademark law (p.371). Implicit in Austin’s essay is that if courts were to
follow his suggestions, expansive trademark rights would be limited
because it is not clear that an elimination of any likelihood of confusion is a
benefit to consumers. Utilizing the fair use defense in trademark law as a
foil, Austin points out that there are other policies, such as competition,
which benefit consumers but may be reduced due to an over-emphasis on
the “unassailable empirical truth” of trademark law’s likelihood of
confusion (pp.370, 402-403).
As the final essay in this subsection, Eric Goldman brings to light the very
real dangers posed by over protection of trademarks in the online context,
where consumers utilize trademarks in their assessment of products
(pp.404-429). Unlike in the offline realm of consumer “word of mouth,”
critical consumers in the online realm can be more powerful in shaping
other consumers’ perceptions of products and brands (pp.404-05, 413).
Although this creates for trademark owners unprecedented levels of
accountability for their actions, Goldman warns that inconsistent application
of current trademark doctrines threatens to undo this benefit for consumers
(p.405). More specifically, Goldman insightfully shows how courts
applying current doctrines such as the “use in commerce” analysis, the
inchoateness of likelihood of confusion analyses and the narrowness of the
trademark fair use defenses, can function to excise online word of mouth
(pp.414-428). This allows trademark owners to delete from the Internet
those reviews and opinions that are not favorable to the owners, which
eliminates a crucial segment of information regarding products and brands
that is beneficial to consumers. As a parting reminder of the importance of
limiting these doctrines (of which Goldman provides several helpful
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suggestions), Goldman concludes, “[t]aken to the extreme, the depletion of
negative online word of mouth reduces the utility of the Internet as a
credible information resource, forcing consumers to seek other information
sources that may have higher search costs” (p.429).
The third subsection in this “Critical Issues” part of TRADEMARK LAW
AND THEORY turns the reader to one of the more recent areas of
trademark law scholarship, that of traditional knowledge. On the whole,
scholarly attention to the area of traditional knowledge and its relation to
trademark law is more recent, as Susy Frankel points out in her essay
(pp.433-463). Historically, protection of indigenous peoples’ rights in
traditional knowledge and cultural intellectual property has been considered
more in light of patent or copyright protection (p.433). However, Frankel
and the second essay author in the section, Coenraad Visser (pp.464-478),
show the reader that thinking of traditional knowledge in terms of
trademark law is not far off the mark. But both Frankel and Visser are
quick to point out that trademark law has been used to both undermine
protection in traditional knowledge, as well as boost it (pp.434, 464).
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that both scholars ultimately conclude that
trademark law is not the perfect fit for protection of traditional knowledge.
Frankel suggests that a trademark-type of system to protect cultural
intellectual property in signs and symbols would be beneficial, but one that
is specifically geared to the needs and concerns of indigenous peoples
(pp.462-463). Similarly, Visser suggests that future protection of traditional
knowledge may need to come in the form of alternatives to trademark law,
such as the development of a “supranational information infrastructure,” or
even a regime closer to copyright law (pp.477-478).
The final subsection, “The Edges of Trademark Protection,” provides the
reader with a contemplation of two under-explored trademark issues, that of
trademark law’s intersection with copyright (pp.481-497) and trademark
protection of product design (pp.498–522). Jane Ginsburg’s essay brings in
a well-rounded view of copyright’s influence on trademark law: both the
good and the ugly. Ginsburg provides a critical examination of the United
States Supreme Court case, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., in which the Court strictly construed the federal trademark law’s
“origin of goods” language of “false designations of origin” cause of action
to simply physical goods (p.484). In doing so, Ginsburg argues that the
Court “overlooks the role that the author’s name plays in conveying
information material to the purchasing decision” (p.484). From the bad
influence that the Court’s misapplication of copyright principles has had on
trademark law, Ginsburg moves onto the good influence, positing that it is
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from copyright’s influence that free speech-based concerns are limiting the
expansive scope of trademark protection (pp.490-497). Ginsburg concludes
that the influence of copyright law on trademark’s fair use defense “shows
us that copyright concepts and methodologies can salubriously influence
trademark law, not by cordoning copyright off from trademarks, as in
Dastar, but by recognizing and drawing the best from the overlap in subject
matter and (where relevant) in the rationale for extending or denying
protection” (p.497).
Last, but not least, Alison Firth takes up an exploration of trademark law’s
protection of product designs, the so-called “Cinderella” of intellectual
property (p.498). Firth provides a true comparative look at the protection
given to product designs under European, American, Canadian, New
Zealand and Japanese trademark law (pp.498-522). Firth points out an
interesting paradox: although trademarks “carry quality and ‘lifestyle’
messages as well as indications of origin,” product design, even where it is
protected as a trademark, is held firmly to a traditional notion of a
trademark, that of source of origin (p.501). Although Firth is cautious in
drawing any broad conclusions from her comparative analysis, she does
note that in certain jurisdictions, like the United States, where design
protection is based on more narrow criteria, conversely, registration of
shapes is more generous (p.522).
All in all, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, provides the reader with an excellent
overview of the threads of current trademark law scholarship. Each essay
could easily stand on its own, but in such a well-rounded compilation such
as Dinwoodie & Janis have put together, each essay adds context and value
to the others.
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